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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Donald Victor Baker appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged Baker with trafficking in methamphetamine (Ada County
Case No. CR-2010-19696); and methamphetamine possession with intent to
deliver (Ada County Case No. CR-2010-14470). (R., pp.162-163. 1) The state
also charged Baker with the persistent violator sentencing enhancement in both
cases.

(R., pp.162-163).

trafficking

in

Pursuant to plea agreement, Baker pied guilty to

methamphetamine,

and the

state agreed to dismiss the

methamphetamine possession with intent to deliver charge and both sentencing
enhancements. (Id.) Further pursuant to the agreement, the state was permitted
to argue the facts of the dismissed charge at sentencing, and to seek restitution
for lab and investigative costs associated with the dismissed charge. (Id.) The
state also agreed to recommend no more than the three-year mandatory
minimum fixed sentence for methamphetamine trafficking. (Id.) The district court
imposed a unified 15-year sentence with three years fixed. (R., p.181.) Baker
filed no direct appeal of his conviction or sentence. (See R., p.137.)
In April 2012, Baker filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (R.,
pp.5-18.) ·He later filed an amended petition. (R., pp.136-160.) The district court
1

See also Idaho Data Repository, Ada County Case Nos. CR-2010-14470; CR2010-19696.

1

denied Baker's motion for appointment of counsel and his various requests to
conduct discovery. (R., pp.32, 121-122, 128)
The court construed Baker's petition as containing the following claims
and sub-claims: 1. His trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to investigate
whether police officers could have identified him in the environmental conditions
present at the time of his arrest; (b) failing to obtain information that the C.I. who
conducted the controlled drug buy had a pending criminal charge and an
agreement with the state regarding his participation in Baker's case; (c) failing to
challenge certain testimony from the grand jury proceedings; (d) failing to file a
motion to suppress; (e) failing to challenge the restitution award; (f) failing to
utilize an entrapment defense; and (g) coercing him to plead guilty; (2) the state
committed Brady2 violations by: (a) failing to disclose that the C.I. had a pending
criminal charge against him and an agreement with the state to participate in
Baker's case; (b) failing to disclose the original audio recording of the controlled
buy and instead disclosing only a redacted version; and (c) failing to disclose that
it had switched the high-end methamphetamine associated with Baker's case
with cheaper low-grade methamphetamine shards, and then presenting the latter
to the district court at the sentencing hearing; 3 (3) the officers entrapped him; and
(4) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order Baker to pay

restitution in the dismissed case. (R., pp.273-283, 318-320.)

2

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)

3

The district court did not reference this claim regarding the methamphetamine
shards in its second notice of intent to dismiss, but did so in its dismissal order
after Baker raised it in his response to the court's notice. (R., pp.293-296, 318319.)

2

After entering two separate notices of intent to dismiss (R., pp.203-213,
273-283), the district court summarily dismissed Baker's petition (R., pp.318320). The court concluded that Baker failed to allege facts which, if true, would
entitle him to relief as to any of his claims.

(R., pp.273-283, 318-320, 323.)

Baker appealed. 4 (R., pp.301-304.)

4

Baker appears to have filed a notice of appeal from a non-appealable order the district court's second notice of intent to dismiss the post-conviction petition.
(R., pp.301-304); I.AR. 11. The Idaho Supreme Court conditionally dismissed
the appeal (12/6/13 Order; 1/22/14 Order), but withdrew this dismissal and
reinstated the appeal after the district court subsequently entered an appealable
final order summarily dismissing Baker's post-conviction petition. (4/17/14 Order;
R., pp.323.) Baker's premature notice of appeal was therefore perfected upon
the subsequent entry of the district court's final judgment. See Weller v. State,
145 Idaho 652, 654, 200 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Ct App. 2008). (Recognizing that
while a strict interpretation of the appellate rules would render premature notices
ineffective in such circumstances, the Idaho Supreme Court has frequently held
otherwise and has exercised its discretion to consider the merits of such appeals.
19.:. (citations omitted.)
3

ISSUES
Baker's brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal as required
by I.AR. 35(a)(4).
The state phrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Baker failed to show that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition?
2.
Has Baker failed to show that the district court erred in denying his
requests to conduct discovery?

4

ARGUMENT

I.
Baker Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition

A

Introduction
Baker contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his

post-conviction petition. (See generally Appellant's brief.) However, a review of
the record reveals that Baker failed to allege facts which, if true, demonstrated he
was entitled to relief as to any of his claims. Therefore, he cannot show that the
district court erred.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).

C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings And
Identification Of The Issues Raised In Baker's Appellant's Brief
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.

A petition for post-conviction relief

initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522,

5

164 P.3d at 802; state v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550
(1983).

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal. of an application for
post-conviction relief, in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative, if the applicant "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the
burden of proof." Berg v. state. 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing, deemed true. Cooperv. State, 96 Idaho 542,545,531 P.2d 1187, 1190
(1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Also, because the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the
event of an evidentiary hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the court alone
will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. State v.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). That is, the judge in a
post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the
most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.

6

kh

In this case, Baker's petition, amended petition, and appellant's brief are
lengthy, repetitive, and difficult to decipher.

Baker's Appellant's brief does not

contain a statement of issues on appeal as required by I.AR. 35(a)(4).
The affidavits and exhibits Baker submitted to the district court are sparse,
vague, conclusory, and generally do not support the arguments he raises in his
petition. (See R., pp.17-18, 136-160, 229-230, 235-245, 292-300.) Below and
on appeal, Baker asserts that he hired a private law firm to investigate his postconviction claims, and that this firm compiled a "final report" supporting his
claims. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-5, 21-22; R., p.219.) However, the record does
not contain any such report.

The only evidence relating to this private

investigation contained in the record is a letter from the law firm apologizing to
Baker that it could not be of significant assistance to him (R., pp.229-230), and
documents that Baker purports to be related to a separate criminal case involving
the C.I. who was involved in the controlled drug buy that led to Baker's arrest (R.,
pp.183-195).
Further, on appeal, Baker does not assign any specific error to the district
court, 5 but instead provides lengthy recitations of relevant law without applying it
to his case, and largely repeats arguments submitted in support of his petition

This Court may affirm the district court's summary dismissal of Baker's petition
on the ground that he failed to assign specific error to the district court. It is well
settled that the appellate court will not review actions of the district court for
which no error has been assigned and will not otherwise search the record for
errors. State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983); see also
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (a party waives an
issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking).
5

7

submitted below.

(See generally Appellant's brief.)

It is thus difficult both to

identify the claims raised, and to thoroughly respond to each of them.
The district court construed Baker's petition as containing four claims and
numerous sub-claims as described above in the "Statement of Facts and Course
of Proceedings." (R., pp.273-283, 318-320.)

On appeal, Baker does not argue

that the district court failed to address any of his claims in dismissing his petition,
or that the state or the court mischaracterized any of his claims. (See generally
Appellant's brief.) Thus, all of the claims potentially at issue before this Court are
among those identified by the district court in its second notice of intent to
dismiss and its dismissal order. 6 Baker has not raised all of these claims in his
Appellant's brief. Instead, the state liberally construes 7 Baker's Appellant's brief
as challenging the district court's summary dismissal of the following claims: (1)
His trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to investigate whether officers could
have identified him in the environmental conditions present at the time of his
arrest; (b) failing to obtain information that the C. I. who conducted the controlled
drug buy had a pending criminal charge and an agreement with the state
regarding his participation in Baker's case; (c) failing to challenge the restitution

6

Therefore, any claims that Baker attempts to raise on appeal that were not
among those identified by the district court in_ either its second notice of intent to
dismiss the petition, or in its dismissal order, are unpreserved, and may not be
considered on appeal. Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061,
1062 (1991) (explaining that, generally, issues not raised below may not be
considered for the first time on appeal).
7

To the extent that this Court construes Baker's petition as containing any
additional claims, the state relies on the analysis set forth the by the district court
in summarily dismissing Baker's post-conviction petition. (See R., pp.203-213,
273-283, 318'."319.)
8

award; and (d) coercing him into to pleading guilty; and (2) the state committed
Brady violations by: (a) failing to disclose the original audio recording of the
controlled buy and instead disclosing only a redacted version; and (b) failing to
disclose that the C.I. had a pending criminal charge and an agreement with the
state to participate in Baker's case. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Baker has
failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of any of these
claims.

D.

Baker Failed To Show He Was Entitled To Relief As To Any Of His
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must

demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by
specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of
counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903.
An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable .... " Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but

9

for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988);
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).

1.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That His Trial
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Perform An Adequate
Investigation

Baker contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately investigate his case prior to the entry of his guilty plea. (Appellant's
brief, pp.14-16, R., pp.276-277.) Specifically, the district court construed Baker's
petition as asserting that officers could not have identified him in the
environmental conditions that were present at the time of his arrest, and that his
attorney should have more adequately investigated this potential defense. (R.,
pp.276-277.)

Baker's claim fails because it is conclusory and not adequately

supported by admissible evidence.
"[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.

In any

ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure
of deference to counsel's judgments." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. However, "the
duty to investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off
chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when
they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste." Rompilla
v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005). "When counsel focuses on some issues to
the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he or she did so for

10

tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect." Suits v. State, 143 Idaho
160, 164, 139 P.3d 762, 766 (Ct. App. 2006} (citing Yarborough v. Gentry. 540
U.S. 1, 8 (2003}.
In this case, as the district court properly concluded (R., pp.276-277),
Baker failed to adequately support this claim with admissible evidence.

In his

amended post-conviction petition, Baker asserts that he enlisted a friend to take
photographs at the site of his arrest from various distances, and that the friend
reported to him that he was unable to identify a person in a vehicle from relatively
short distances. (R., pp.147-148.) This hearsay, presented without appropriate
context regarding what the police observed, is insufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact with regard to this claim.
Further, the state asserts that because Baker chose to plead guilty and
accept a favorable plea agreement in which a felony charge and two sentencing
enhancements were dismissed (R., pp.162-163), his attorney was not required to
engage in as thorough an investigation to uncover potential factual defenses to
the charge that he may have been had the case proceeded to jury trial. At the
change of plea hearing, Baker testified that he understood he was waiving his
right to require the state to prove the charges against him, that he was satisfied
with his counsel's representation, and that there was not anything that he wanted
his counsel to do that his counsel had not yet done. (R., pp.166-167.)

This

contradicts Baker's allegation that he asked his counsel to more closely
investigate the credibility of the officers' identification of him. Baker's after-the-

11

fact disagreements with his counsel's pre-trial investigative strategies do not
demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective.
Baker also failed to demonstrate prejudice from any deficiency. Baker has
failed to allege facts demonstrating that the officers' initial visual identification of
him during the controlled drug buy was so critical to the state's case that Baker
would not have pied guilty had he been successful in casting doubt on that
identification. (R., pp.177-178.) Though there was no jury trial to further develop
the facts, it appears the state's case was based upon a phone call between the
Baker and the C.I., and the subsequent controlled buy in the parking lot, both of
which were recorded. (See R., pp.168-169.)
Because Baker failed to allege facts which, if true, would entitle him to
relief on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
investigate the case, this Court should affirm the trial court's summary dismissal
of this claim.
2.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That His Trial
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Adequately Investigate The
C.I.

Baker contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain
information that the C. I. who conducted the controlled buy with Baker had a
pending criminal charge and an agreement with the state to participate in Baker's
case. (Appellant's brief, pp.16, 23; R., p.277.) Baker's claim fails because it is
conclusory and not adequately supported by admissible evidence.
Baker has failed to provide context or specifics regarding his allegations.
For example, Baker has failed to allege or present evidence that his trial counsel

12

was unaware of the C.l.'s pending criminal charge, that trial counsel's advice to
Baker regarding whether to plead guilty would have been different had he known
of the potential impeachment evidence, 8 or that Baker would have declined to
accept the state's plea agreement if he had access to this information.
Because he failed to assert facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief
· on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
investigate the C.I., this Court should affirm the trial court's summary dismissal of
this claim.
The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That His
Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Challenge The
Restitution Award

3.

Baker contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
the restitution award. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.) Baker appears to assert that
it was unlawful for the district court to order him to pay restitution associated with
his dismissed charge. (See R., p.7, 224.) Baker's claim fails both because he
failed to adequately support it with admissible evidence, and because it is belied
by the record.
As the district court recognized (R., p.278), the terms of the plea
agreement

permitted

the

state

to

seek

restitution

on

the

dismissed

With respect to both Baker's ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims
relating to the C.I., the state liberally infers that Baker asserts that evidence of the
pending criminal charge against C.I. could have been used as impeachment
evidence at trial.
However, in his amended post-conviction petition and
Appellant's brief, Baker's issue with the C.l.'s pending criminal charge appears to
instead be that it violated the C.l.'s agreement with the Idaho State Police. (See
Appellant's brief, pp.21-24; R., p.150.) Whether or not the C.I. breached any
agreement with the Idaho State Police has no bearing on Baker's conviction or
post-conviction claims._
8

13

methamphetamine charge as a term of the plea agreement entered into by .
Baker. (R., p.163.) Idaho law permits courts to, with the consent of the parties,
order restitution even where the crime is not adjudicated or not before the court.
I.C. § 19-5304(9).

Further, Baker submitted no evidence supporting any

allegation that the restitution amount awarded by the court was unreasonable, or
that the awarded restitution amount would have been different had Blake's
counsel challenged it.
Because he failed to assert facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief
on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
restitution award, this Court should affirm the trial court's summary dismissal of
this claim.
4.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That His
Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Coercing Him To Plead Guilty

Baker contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for coercing him to
plead guilty.

(Appellant's brief, pp.7, 15, 18.)

This claim fails because it is

conclusory and not adequately supported by admissible evidence.
Baker has failed to provide context or specifics regarding this claim.
Baker submitted no evidence that any advice from his trial counsel to plead guilty
was based upon ignorance of the law or any other objective deficiency.

Further,

as noted above, Baker entered into a favorable plea agreement in which a felony
methamphetamine charge and two sentencing enhancements were dismissed.
Baker has not demonstrated that the state's case against him was weak or that
there were any other factors that rendered his counsel's advice with regard to the

14

plea agreement deficient.

This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's

summary dismissal of this claim.

E.

Baker Has Failed To Show He Was Entitled To Relief As To Either Of His
Brady Claims
Due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense all

exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession. Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).

When there has been a conviction after trial, a Brady

violation is found if the defendant can show:

(1) that the evidence was

exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the state;
and (3) materiality (i.e. prejudice). State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380, 247
P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)).
On a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of prejudice is whether
there is a reasonable probability that, but for the state's failure to produce the
information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but would have
insisted upon going to trial. Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415, 418, 162 P.3d 794,
797 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 436, 885 P.2d 1144,
1152 (Ct. App. 1994). In making this determination, the court will "employ an
objective assessment, based in part on the persuasiveness of the withheld
information as to whether the particular defendant and his counsel would have
insisted on going to trial." Roeder, 144 Idaho at 418-419, 162 P.3d at 797-798.
The court will not consider a defendant's subjective statements that he would not
have pied guilty had he known of the information.

&

at 419, 162 P.3d at 798.

The court must also consider any objective motivations a defendant may have
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had for pleading guilty. Gardner, 126 Idaho at 436-437, 885 P.2d at 1152-1153.
"Any benefit derived by the defendant from the guilty plea is a significant factor
inasmuch as a plea may be heavily motivated by reduction of exposure to
additional charges and criminal penalties."
1.

kl at 437,

885 P.2d at 1153

The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That The State
Failed To Disclose An Unredacted Version Of The Audio Recording
Of The Controlled Buy

Baker contends that the state committed a Brady violation by failing to
disclose an unredacted version of the audio recording of the controlled buy, and
by instead disclosing only a redacted version which "ended prematurely."
(Appellant's brief, pp.22-23, 27; R., p.146.)

Baker's claim fails because he has

failed to support it with adequate admissible evidence.
Baker's assertions that the state disclosed only a redacted version of the
audio recording, and that the redacted material was exculpatory, is based upon
an affidavit of Jason Whitaker.

(R., pp.159-160.)

In the affidavit, Whitaker

asserted that he approached a vehicle in a Boise Shopko parking lot, presumably
on the date and location of the controlled buy leading to Baker's arrest.

(Id.)

Whitaker asserted that he saw his roommate (whom Baker asserts was the C. I.),
in the vehicle and wanted to "make sure everything was okay." (Id.) Whitaker
then asserted that "[e]verything must [have] been okay because I don't
remember anything." (Id.) These alleged facts are not sufficient to raise an issue
of genuine issue of material fact with regard to this claim.
First, Baker has not submitted evidence demonstrating that the state
redacted the audio, or that any such redaction was unknown to Baker and/or his
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trial counsel prior to his guilty plea. In any event, even assuming that the state
redacted some kind of communication between Whitaker and Baker or the C.I.
(or simply limited its disclosure to the relevant portion of the audio recording
involving discussion of the drug buy), Baker has failed to allege or demonstrate
that any such statement was exculpatory and material to his guilt or innocence.
As noted above, Whitaker's affidavit contained no information regarding what he
said or did not say when he encountered the C.I. Baker's allegations regarding
this claim are entirely speculative. Therefore, Baker has failed to allege facts
demonstrating that any information redacted from the audio was exculpatory, that
the information was actually suppressed by the state, or that the information
resulted in Baker pleading guilty rather than pursuing a jury trial.
Finally, as the district court implicitly recognized (R., pp.279-281), Baker
waived this claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal

Generally, a post-

conviction petition is not a substitute for a direct appeal, and any issue which
could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited.

I.C. § 19-

4901 (b). Any alleged redaction in the audio recording disclosed by the state
would or should have been apparent to Baker prior to entering his guilty plea,
particularly since Baker was present when the controlled buy took place.

He

therefore could have raised this issue on direct appeal.
Baker has failed to allege facts, which if true, indicate that he was entitled
to relief on his Brady claim regarding the audio recording of the controlled buy.
Baker has therefore failed to show that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing this claim.
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2.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That The State
Failed To Disclose Criminal Record Of C.I.

Baker contends that the state committed a Brady violation by failing to
disclose that the C.I. who was involved in the controlled buy leading to Baker's
arrest had a pending criminal charge and an agreement with the state to
participate in Baker's case. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-24; R., pp.277.)

Baker's

argument fails because he has failed to allege facts which, if true, indicate he is
entitled to relief on this claim.
First, it is not clear from the record that Baker has alleged or presented
evidence to support any proposition that the state failed to disclose the existence
of any pending criminal charge against the C.I., or any agreement regarding that
charge and the C.l.'s role in the controlled buy.

Nor has Baker alleged or

presented evidence demonstrating that he or his trial counsel were unaware of
the C.l.'s pending criminal charge or agreement with the state at the time Baker
entered his guilty plea.
In any event, the state had no duty to disclose such information prior to
Baker's guilty plea because it was merely potential impeachment evidence.
"The United States Constitution does not require the State to disclose material
impeachment information prior to entering a plea agreement with the defendant."
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 105 P.3d 376, 390 (2004) (emphasis added)
(citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)).

This is because

impeachment evidence "is special in relation to the fairness of a trial not in
respect to whether a plea is voluntary." Dunlap. 141 Idaho at 64, 106 P.3d at 390
(emphasis in original) (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629); see also United States v.
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Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Ruiz teaches that Brady does not
protect against the possible prejudice that may ensue from the loss of an
opportunity to plea..:bargain with complete knowledge of all relevant facts. This
makes good sense: when a defendant chooses to admit his guilt, Brady concerns
subside.").
Impeachment evidence is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e.
to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth evidence which
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. State v. Marsh,
141 Idaho 862, 868-869, 119 P.3d 637, 643-644 (Ct. App. 2004). Exculpatory
evidence relates to a defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho
772, 781, 984 P.2d 127, 136 (1997).
In this case, any evidence regarding pending criminal charges against the
C.I., or any agreement between the state and the C.I. regarding those charges
and his participation in the controlled drug buy, was merely potentially
impeaching, and not material to Baker's guilt or innocence as to the crime of
trafficking in methamphetamine. The state therefore had no duty to disclose this
information prior to Baker's guilty plea.
Further, Baker has also failed to allege facts demonstrating that he would
have chosen not to plead guilty had he access to such potential impeachment
evidence about the C.I. The value of such evidence in this case would be limited
because it would not be particularly surprising to a jury that a C.I. had a pending
criminal drug charge against him, and had some agreement with the state to
participate in a controlled buy. Therefore, even assuming both that the state had

19

some duty to disclose information about the C.I. prior to Baker's guilty plea, and
that the state failed to do so, Baker cannot demonstrate prejudice.
Baker has failed to allege facts, which if true, indicate that he was entitled
\

to relief on his Brady claim regarding the C. I. 's pending criminal charges and
agreement with the state.

Baker has therefore failed to show that the district

court erred in summarily dismissing this claim.

II.
Baker Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His
Requests To Conduct Discovery

A

Introduction
Baker contends that the district court erred by denying his various post-

conviction discovery requests. (Appellant's brief, pp.5, 13, 32.) Baker has failed
to show that the district court abused his discretion because his discovery
requests were premature, and because he cannot demonstrate that the
requested discovery was necessary to protect his substantial rights.

B.

Standard of Review
Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter put to the

sound discretion of the district court. I.C.R. 57(b); Raudebaugh v. State, 135
Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001) (citing Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311,
319, 912 P.2d 679, 687 (Ct. App. 1996)). On review, the appellate court must
determine whether the district court "acted within the boundaries of its discretion,
consistent with any legal standards applicable to its specific choices, and whether
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the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Lafferty. 125
Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994).
C.

The District Court Properly Denied Baker's Discovery Request
Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b) provides that, "the. provisions for discovery in

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall not apply to the [post-conviction relief]
proceedings unless and only to the extent ordered by the trial court." Idaho
Criminal Rule 57(f) limits discovery to prevent the state and the court from being
inundated with discovery requests by applicants who are either unaware of
proper methods or are simply on fishing expeditions. The Idaho courts have
recognized that traditional discovery methods, normally applicable to civil cases,
might be inappropriate in collateral proceedings. Jacobsen v. State, 99 Idaho 45,
50, 577 P.2d 24, 29 (1978); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 402, 973 P.2d
749, 754 (Ct. App. 1999). In Raudebaugh, the Idaho Supreme Court explained,
· "Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the
district court is not required to order discovery." Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 605,
21 P.3d at 927.
Further, "[i]n order to be granted discovery, a post-conviction applicant
must identify the specific subject matter where discovery is requested and why
discovery as to those matters is necessary to his or her application." State v.
LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Ct. App. 2003), citing
Aeschliman, 132 Idaho at 402-03, 973 P.2d at 754-55.
In this case, Baker appears to assert that the district court erred by
denying his discovery requests. (Appellant's brief, pp.5, 13, 32.) However, on
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appeal, Baker does not identify any specific discovery request or argue why such
discovery was necessary either to protect his substantial rights, or even to
support his post-conviction claims. This Court may decline to consider this claim
on this basis. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970.
In any event, Baker has failed to demonstrate error. In the course of the
post-conviction proceeding below, Baker requested: a transcript of the grand jury
proceedings; the audio recording of the controlled buy; the audio recording of a
debriefing between the C.I. and police; and interrogatories and depositions from
his defense attorney, three Idaho State Police Officers, and an alleged witness to
the underlying controlled buy. (R., pp.50-52, 123-127.) He also subpoenaed an
Idaho State Police Detective to appear at court even though no evidentiary
hearing had been scheduled.

(R., p.104.)

The district court denied these

requests and quashed the subpoena. (R., pp.121-122, 128.) Baker has failed to
show that the district court abused its discretion.
First, Baker's discovery requests were premature. The district court did
not outright deny Baker's discovery requests, but instead stated that it would not
grant them "at this point," during the I.C. § 19-4906 summary dismissal stage of
the post-conviction proceeding.

(R., p.128.)

Other courts have similarly

conducted the summary dismissal procedure in this manner and allowed
petitioners to renew their request for discovery at a later date. See LePage, 138
Idaho at 810, 69 P.3d at 1071; Aeschliman, 132 Idaho at 402-03, 973 P.2d at
754-55.

The district court had no obligation to grant discovery prior to its

summary dismissal of Baker's petition. Had Baker alleged facts which, if true,
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demonstrated he was entitled him to relief as to any of his claims, he would have
had the opportunity to further pursue those claims in an evidentiary hearing.
Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion because granting
Baker's motion was not necessary to protect Baker's substantial rights.

Baker

does not adequately describe in the motion or on appeal how his substantive
rights would be affected by the lack of discovery. The district court took judicial
notice of the underlying criminal record (R., pp.45-47), and had full ability to
evaluate whether Baker raised a genuine issue of material fact as to any of his
claims.
Baker has failed to show that his discovery requests were necessary, at
the time he made them, to protect a substantial right. He has therefore failed to
show that the district court abused its discretion in denying these requests.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Baker's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 16th day of March, 2015

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

23

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of March, 2015, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Donald V. Baker
IDOC #49484
ISCI Unit 15/B181A
P.O. Box 14
Boise, Idaho 83707

MARK W. OLSON'
Deputy Attorney General

MWO/vr

24

